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REDUCING BAY NUTRIENTS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
ALAN J. KRUPNICK*
In 1983 the governors of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania,
the Mayor of the District of Columbia (hereinafter "the States") and
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) commit-
ted their resources to improving environmental quality and living
resources in the Chesapeake Bay by signing the landmark Chesa-
peake Bay Agreement.' Then, in December of 1987, they demon-
strated a strengthened commitment by signing a new agreement to
reduce nutrient loadings to the Chesapeake Bay by 40 percent by
the year 2000.2
The resolve to reduce nutrients is important for at least two
reasons. First, the new agreement will galvanize the policy process
by replacing the vague goals of the 1983 Bay Agreement with spe-
cific load reduction targets. Second, the nutrient reduction agree-
ment addresses an important problem. Excessive nutrient loadings
have been identified as a major cause of degradation of the Chesa-
peake Bay. They spur the growth of algae that in turn deplete oxy-
gen from the water while preventing sunlight from reaching the
submerged aquatic vegetation that is critical to the Bay's living re-
sources. Also, nutrient loadings are likely to keep increasing if un-
checked. Population growth will increase nutrient loads to
wastewater treatment plants and groundwater, and the trend to-
wards increasing fertilizer use in agriculture (particularly nitrogen-
based fertilizer) means an increase in loads as well.
* Fellow, Quality of the Environment Division of Resources for the Future. Ph.D.,
University of Maryland, 1980; B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1969.
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Eric Van De Verg and
the information supplied by Ivar Strand.
1. The Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 1983, reprinted in CITIZENS PROGRAM FOR THE
CHESAPEAKE BAY, CHOICES FOR THE CHESAPEAKE: AN ACTION AGENDA-1983 CHESA-
PEAKE BAY CONFERENCE REPORT 17 (Jan. 1984).
2. The new agreement also calls for the re-evaluation of this target by December
1991; the development of implementation plans for the control of toxic materials and
conventional pollutants; the development of guidelines to reduce adverse impacts of
economic development; the commissioning of a panel of experts to analyze the impacts
of anticipated growth on the Bay and suggest approaches for its management; the devel-
opment of Bay-wide public communication plans; the assessment of valuable living re-
sources and development of Bay-wide fishery management plans; and the development
of criteria for the protection of habitats. 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement 7, 9, 10 (Dec.
14, 1987) (available at the Maryland Law Review).
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Although a laudable achievement, this new agreement raises a
number of important questions. For example, is a 40 percent reduc-
tion in nutrients appropriate? Also, what rules should guide the al-
location of these reductions across the States?
3
These issues can be examined from a variety of perspectives. In
this paper, the perspective is one of economic theory and ap-
proaches to policy analysis and design based on such theory. Eco-
nomic theory is concerned primarily with identifying allocations of
economic activity that maximize social welfare, defined in terms of
the aggregate of individual preferences, and designing policies that
achieve these allocations. As people value consumer as well as envi-
ronmental goods, the objective of environmental economic analysis
is to bring about an allocation of cleanup efforts and other economic
activity that maximizes satisfaction over both classes of goods.
Stated another way, economic analysis seeks to balance the negative
consequences of environmental protection, in terms of the opportu-
nity cost of resources used to improve environmental quality, with
the positive, if often more intangible, effects of such protection on
social welfare.
Why is this perspective important? The problems now facing
the Bay are enormous, and they will worsen unless effective strate-
gies for Bay cleanup are devised and implemented. In the absence
of new controls on nutrient loadings, population growth and land-
use changes are expected to result in increases in phosphorus and
nitrogen loadings of 43 and 7 percent, respectively, from 1980 to
the year 2000.' Intense development pressure and shrinking gov-
ernment budgets are likely to make stemming such nutrient growth
a difficult task. Therefore, the policies adopted for the Bay must
buy as much protection as possible for the resources available. Un-
less these issues are addressed, the cleanup may be ineffective and
3. Another question is how state policies should be designed to meet reduction
targets. (The question of who should pay is subsumed under this question.) For a gen-
eral discussion of this issue for nonpoint source pollution control strategies, see Har-
rington, Krupnick & Peskin, Evaluation of Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Policies, 40 J.
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 27-32 (1985); J. Dunn &J. Shortle, Agricultural Nonpoint
Source Pollution Control in Theory & Practice, presented at the Third Annual Conference on
the Economics of Chesapeake Bay Management in Annapolis, Md. (May 27-29, 1987)
(preliminary draft).
4. See CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CHES-
APEAKE BAY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 41 (Sept. 1983) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION]. As of this writing, the office of the Chesapeake Bay Pro-
gram (CBP) is preparing a new report expected to provide updated baseline loadings as
well as estimates of load reductions and costs associated with a number of control
scenarios.
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unduly costly to society as a whole and to the governments currently
bearing the brunt of the cleanup expense. As the costs of cleaning
up the Bay mount or, worse still, if improvement to the Bay falls
short of expectations, the fragile fabric of political commitment that
now binds government, business, and the public may tear and jeop-
ardize the Bay cleanup.
Economic analysis can help maintain and strengthen this new
commitment to reducing nutrient loadings through use of cost-ben-
efit and cost-effectiveness analysis. In theory, cost-benefit analysis
can be used to find an efficient level of nutrient reduction, a level
which maximizes the net benefits of efforts to improve the quality of
the Bay. Cost-effectiveness analysis could be employed to choose or
design policies to attain a given nutrient reduction at the minimum
cost to society. It also can be used to obtain the maximum level of
environmental improvement for any given level of social or govern-
mental spending.
Consideration of economics is necessary, but by no means suffi-
cient, for making public policy decisions. Concern for the distribu-
tion of social welfare-the equity issue-obviously is important.
Economic theory cannot offer guidance as to the appropriate distri-
bution of income, although economic analysis can help predict and
measure the distributional consequences of policy decisions. The
ethical view of environmental protection also should be considered,
but likewise lies outside of the purview of economics.5
I. Is THE 40 PERCENT REDUCTION APPROPRIATE?
Reducing nutrients in the Bay is not an end in itself. Rather, it is
a target measure consistent with the attainment of some water qual-
ity goal, the improvement of the health and viability of Bay re-
sources, and ultimately, an improvement in social welfare, broadly
defined to include the values people place on preserving the Bay's
ecology. The 1987 Bay Agreement's specific nutrient reduction
targets-40 percent each for total nitrogen (TN) and total phos-
phorus (TP) loadings by the year 2000-are designed to meet a spe-
cific ambient goal: a change in dissolved oxygen levels in the
5. Philosopher Mark Sagoff contrasts the economic and the ethical approach to en-
vironmental protection, describing the latter approach as "moral: it regards pollution
and environmental degradation as evils society must eliminate if we are to live up to our
ideals and aspirations." See Sagoff, Where Ickes Went Right or Reason and Rationality in Envi-
ronmental Law, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 266 (1987). He concludes that the use of cost-
effectiveness analysis to achieve ethically based goals may be a reasonable synthesis of
the two approaches. Id. at 322.
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bottom waters of the main stem of the Chesapeake Bay from 0 to 1
ppm in the summer months. Experts view this improvement as a
reasonable goal and one that would significantly improve water
quality in the Bay.6
Even a crude cost-benefit analysis of the nutrient reduction
targets can help to determine whether the benefits to society from
meeting these targets outweigh the costs. With better information,
a finer grained cost-benefit analysis can address whether the targets
are "optimal" in the limited sense that the proposed targets promise
to yield the maximum net economic benefits to society.7 While it is
true that these targets can be relaxed or tightened in the future as
conditions warrant (indeed, the new Bay Agreement calls for a re-
view of the 40 percent reduction goal in 1991), such judgments
should be based, in part, on economic considerations. And while it
also is true that both the scientific and economic data needed to
make such assessments are not complete and contain much uncer-
tainty, without such information these judgments may be unduly in-
fluenced by special interests. Finally, to the extent that some
activities to reduce loadings are irreversible or nonincremental, the
earlier such an analysis is performed, the less likely that costly mis-
takes will be made.
As will become clear below, there is not nearly enough informa-
tion available to perform a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.
Nevertheless, a crude idea of the relative costs and benefits of nutri-
ent reductions can be obtained from existing studies and secondary
data sources. And it is worthwhile to bring together available infor-
mation on costs and benefits, if only to identify data gaps and other
areas of uncertainty and to introduce a way of thinking about the
economics of managing the Bay.
To perform a cost-benefit analysis of the nutrient reduction
targets requires information on baseline loadings (to translate per-
centage reductions into quantity reductions) and on the linkages
among: (1) the nutrient reductions and changes in ambient condi-
tions in the main stem; (2) changes in the main stem and changes in
6.'Personal communication with Joseph Macknis, Chesapeake Bay Program, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Sept. 1987).
7. One of the complications ignored in this statement is the fact that each state has
its own water quality objectives for tributaries within the state. If a state agrees to the
Bay-wide nutrient reduction goal, we may assume either that these nutrient reductions
are compatible with its tributary goals or that it plans to remove even more nutrients to
meet the tributary goals. As the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis would be either to
subject the 40% goal to a cost-benefit analysis or to determine the optimal percentage
reduction, independent tributary goals are ignored in this section of the paper.
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ambient conditions elsewhere in the Bay and its tributaries;
(3) changes in ambient conditions and the effects on Bay resources;
(4) changes in Bay resources and the value society places on these
changes; and (5) the nutrient reductions and the costs of obtaining
them.
In this paper, only the fourth and fifth linkages will be ad-
dressed; the other linkages are outside the purview of economics.
Information on the first and second linkages currently is embodied
in the Chesapeake Bay Program's two-dimensional hydrological
computer model of the Bay and the associated estimates of baseline
loadings. The model also includes limited information on the third
linkage.8 Nevertheless, the complex role played by nutrients in phy-
toplankton growth in the Bay is not completely understood. Cur-
rent thinking identifies phosphorus as the limiting factor during the
high-flow, winter months and nitrogen as the limiting factor during
the low-flow, summer months of high algal productivity.9 Since
phosphorus is the limiting factor year round in tributaries, reduc-
tions in phosphorus in tributaries actually can lead to increased
availability of nitrogen for phytoplankton uptake (bioavailability) in
the Bay.
A. Benefits
Economists measure the benefits of reducing nutrient loadings
by the aggregate amount society would be willing to pay for the re-
sulting changes in water quality or the availability and health of Bay
resources. The major, direct benefits of improvements in the Bay's
quality can be classified into four broad categories:' ° (1) recreation
(fishing, boating, swimming); (2) commercial fishing; (3) option
value; and (4) existence value.
Recreation benefits from improved Bay resources arise from in-
creased enjoyment of recreation activities, primarily swimming,
boating, and fishing; more frequent participation in these activities;
8. Personal communication with Joseph Macknis, Chesapeake Bay Program, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Sept. 1987). This model replaces the less sophisti-
cated model used for the Chesapeake Bay Program study. Development of a more so-
phisticated three-dimensional model is in progress.
9. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, AD-Hoc WORKING GROUP ON
NUTRIENTS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NUTRIENT CONTROL IN THE CHES-
APEAKE BAY-A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM 5-6 (Jan. 1986)
[hereinafter NUTRIENT CONTROL IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY].
10. Improved drinking water quality would be another category of benefits, but this
category has not been identified as a major problem for those living near the Chesa-
peake Bay.
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and from an expansion in the number of areas (and perhaps time of
year) in which recreation activities can take place. Economists often
measure recreators' willingness to pay (WTP) by observing the loca-
tion, frequency, and duration of their site visits related to water
quality at the various sites.'"
Commercial fishing benefits are registered through markets. If
nutrient reductions cause increases in fish populations and catch
rates, then these changes will be reflected in reduced marginal fish-
ing costs and lower prices to consumers. Assuming no new entrants
into the fishing industry, these benefits accrue to consumers and
fishermen. With unlimited entry, increased profits to fishermen
eventually disappear due to competition and the long-term benefits
accrue only to consumers.
Option value is the value placed on preserving the option of
using the Bay's services in the future.' 2 Existence value encom-
passes all nonuse-related values;' it is the amount a person would
be willing to pay for Bay water quality improvements that the person
does not currently and never intends to experience. In contrast to
the categories of current use values, existence and option values
usually cannot be estimated directly because there is often no mar-
ket or even nonmarket behavior to be examined. Economists have
devised highly structured questionnaires designed to elicit the WTP
for these nonuse benefits of improved water quality. These survey
techniques also have been used in broad-brush attempts to value
water quality improvements to recreators.
An alternative approach to measuring benefits examines the re-
lationship between residential and commercial location on the one
hand and water quality on the other. If improvements to the Bay
raise nearby housing prices, one can begin to estimate the premium
that people are willing to pay for better water quality. The compo-
nents of benefits in this estimate unfortunately cannot be deter-
mined precisely. There is also a self-selection bias: people who live
close to the Bay are likely to recreate more or value this location
more highly than other people. It is therefore difficult to aggregate
benefit components properly when using property value estimates,
Ii. See A.M. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 195-233 (1979).
12. See Smith, Option Value: A Conceptual Overview, 49 S. EcON. J. 654-68 (1982).
13. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777-86 (1967). Values for
preserving habitats and endangered species can be included here (o the extent that they
are not redundant to use-related values.
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and it is particularly risky to "scale up" estimates drawn from prop-
erty value studies to the general population.
The available evidence on the benefits of improving Bay water
quality is quite sketchy. The best studies examine subsets of the af-
fected populations and geographical areas, and they will be used be-
low to present crude estimates of Bay-wide benefits of water quality
improvements.
Most of the research on the benefits of improving Bay water
quality and living resources has been performed at the University of
Maryland. Using information on origin, destination, frequency of
trips, and other data, Bockstael, McConnell, and Strand (BMS) have
estimated the annual WTP for water quality improvements on the
part of: (1) residents of the Baltimore and Washington, D.C. Stan-
dard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) who use ten public
beaches on Maryland's Western Shore (most of the public beaches
on the. Maryland portion of the Bay); (2) Maryland trailered boat
owners registered in Maryland who use Maryland waters; and
(3) striped bass fishermen who use the Maryland portion of the
Chesapeake Bay. 4 The estimates for beach use and boating are for
a 20 percent reduction in the concentrations of nitrogen and phos-
phorus (in milligrams per liter-mg/I-as opposed to loadings in
pounds per day) and the estimates for bass fishing are for a 20 per-
cent increase in catch rate.' 5
Table 1 presents these benefit estimates for several scenarios
developed to express uncertainties in the data and the approach.
The annual benefits to beach users vary from $8.3 million to $22.6
million and dominate benefits to trailered boat owners (ranging
from $0.6 million to $7.1 million) and striped bass fishermen (rang-
ing from $0.5 million to $1.5 million).
The University of Maryland researchers also asked those resi-
dents of the Baltimore and Washington, D.C. SMSAs who found the
water quality in the Bay unacceptable for swimming to indicate the
additional amount in taxes they would pay annually to raise the
water quality to a level acceptable for swimming. These values aver-
aged between $9 and $184 per household, depending on race
(which may be a surrogate for income) and whether household
14. N. Bockstael, K. McConnell & 1. Strand, Benefits from Improvements in Chesapeake Bay
Water Quality (Mar. 1987) (report submitted to the Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency).
15. Of course, a one-to-one relationship between percentage reduction in nutrient
concentrations and loadings is unlikely, and the functional relationship between per-
centage reduction in nutrients and percentage increase in catch rate is largely unknown.
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members use the Bay for any type of recreation. In the aggregate,
and accounting for uncertainty, these totals ranged from $60 to
$106 million. These figures may be viewed as including all but the
commercial fishing benefits associated with the Bay's water quality
improvement. Thus, they are an alternative measure to the sum of
the recreation use and nonuse benefits. They are not directly com-
parable, however, to the other values in Table 1 because a 20 per-
cent change in water quality may not imply movement from an
unacceptable to an acceptable swimming quality. Moreover, no ad-
justments were made for the actual distribution and extent of ac-
ceptable swimming quality currently available in the Bay.
The nonuser values are particularly interesting.' 6 They show
that nonusers place substantial value on improving the Bay (about
$33 per household per year), but that these values are dwarfed by
those offered by people who use the Bay (about $127 per household
per year). If we take the difference in average values between users
and nonusers as use value,' 7 these figures are almost three times
nonuse values (94/33). But the number of nonusers in the Nation
with an existence value for cleanup of the Bay may be far larger than
the number of users. Thus, total nonuse values may exceed total
use values.
Because these analyses examine different and limited popula-
tions and geographical areas of the Bay, they have been scaled to
provide a crude estimate of Bay-wide benefits of water quality im-
provements. Multiplying the BMS average benefits per unit of activ-
ity (i.e., beach visit, registered trailered boat, fishing day, and
household) by the appropriate activity level permits an extrapola-
tion of recreation benefits to Virginia's portion of the Chesapeake
Bay and to other user populations. Table 2 shows that the total ben-
efits of a 20 percent increase in water quality and catch rate for the
three activities range from $28 to $81 million annually, and that
these benefits are dominated by beach use. Using the more inclu-
sive contingent valuation approach, total benefits range from $117
to $207 million.
Estimates from both approaches have many limitations. The re-
vealed preference estimates assume that benefit estimates per beach
trip, per fishing day, or per boater for Maryland's portion of the Bay
can be applied to Virginia's portion of the Bay. Different configura-
16. The extent to which these values reflect option or existence values, however,
cannot be determined.
17. This is probably an excessive estimate of use value because users are likely to
place higher option and existence values on the Bay than nonusers.
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tions of recreation opportunities in Virginia relative to demand
could easily invalidate, this assumption, although the direction of
bias is unknown. In addition, the extrapolation of striped bass fish-
ing benefits in Maryland to all types of fishing in Virginia is subject
to substantial error as bass fishing represents only 1 percent of Vir-
ginia's fishing participation days.' 8
For many reasons these estimates are likely to be too low. First,
the initial BMS estimates may be too low. As the authors acknowl-
edge, they did not account for an increase in the percentage of the
population that might use the Bay for recreation after an improve-
ment in water quality occurs. Second, benefits resulting from in-
creased beach use by Pennsylvanians and those in other states,
nontrailered boat use, and trailered boat use of Virginia's portion of
the Bay by District of Columbia residents and Virginians residing
outside of the Tidewater counties are not included in the scaled esti-
mates. Third, only a limited number of recreational activities, albeit
the major ones, are included. Fourth, commercial fishing benefits
also are not included. Finally, benefits realized because of improved
water quality in the tributaries above the fall line 9 (and, to an un-
known degree, below the fall line) are not counted.
The contingent valuation estimates are also problematical. The
methods for eliciting such values are not developed and may intro-
duce additional error to the estimates. For instance, there is evi-
dence that stated WTP for improvement in an environmental asset
such as the Bay may be lower when the context of the survey in-
volves cleanup of a number of environmental assets than when the
valuation of only one asset is at issue (as in the BMS survey). The
questions also focus on water quality changes that make swimming
acceptable as opposed to asking for a WTP measurement for the
wide array of physical and biological benefits to the Bay that would
arise from a reduction in nutrients. This narrow focus may lead to a
bias in the benefit estimates, with the direction of bias dependent on
the relationship between nutrient reductions and changes in the ac-
ceptability of the Bay for swimming. Finally, the scaled estimates
are clearly an underestimate of benefits because they ignore use and
nonuse values for those residing outside of the District of Columbia
and the Maryland and Virginia portions of the Chesapeake basin.
Nevertheless, as use values may be substantially lower for residents
of areas more distant from the Bay, one cannot simply multiply the
18. V. NORTON, V.K. SMITH & 1. STRAND, STRIPERS: THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE
ATLANTIC COAST COMMERCIAL AND RECREATIONAL STRIPED BASS FISHERY 13-14 (1983).
19. The "fall line" is the point of furthest extent of tidal influence on a tributary.
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BMS-per-household values by the population in these more distant
areas. To the extent that existence and option values depend on
use, average nonuse values may be substantially lower for those re-
siding far outside of the basin.
Another study by Kahn and Kemp 20 addresses both sportfishing
and commercial fishing benefits. This study examined the relation-
ship between increases in submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) and
growth rates of the major finfish species and blue crabs, and be-
tween changes in growth rates and the social benefits to commercial
and sportfishing in the Bay. Although reductions in nutrient load-
ings can be expected to result in increases in SAV, the relationship
between these two measures is not well understood. Assuming that
a 40 percent reduction in loadings would result in a 40 percent in-
crease in SAV abundance, the authors estimate that recreation and
commercial fishing benefits would be only about $1 million for fin-
fish and blue crabs throughout the Bay. This figure is substantially
lower than those on Table 2 for sportfishing alone.
The lack of correspondence between the BMS and the Kahn
and Kemp estimates highlights the shortcomings of research in this
area. In particular, studies patterned after those by BMS should be
conducted for Virginia. In addition, estimates are needed of the
WTP for improvements to the Bay by residents (both users and non-
users) living outside of the Maryland-District of Columbia-Virginia
use area.
B. Costs
Economists view the cost of reducing nutrient loads to the Bay
as the value of the goods and services society gives up to obtain
these reductions. This is not, in general, the same as the expendi-
tures made by those who shoulder the direct burden of these reduc-
tions. For example, suppose the government requires chicken
farmers to erect waste disposal systems to prevent nutrient runoff.
Society's resources must be diverted to produce the equipment and
to install and operate the disposal system. Everything else being
equal, the social cost of this diversion is the capital plus operating
cost of this equipment, assuming that the prices of the resources
reflect marginal social opportunity cost. But everything else is not
usually equal. With revenues unchanged and production costs in-
20. Kahn & Kemp, Economic Losses Associated with the Degradation of an Ecosystem: The
Case of Submerged Aquatic Vegetation in the Chesapeake Bay, 40 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGmrr. 27
(1985).
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creased, -farmers' profits fall. In response to actual or expected
lower profits, farmers may adjust their production techniques to
minimize their losses." In addition, the price of chickens may rise
and the quantity produced and sold may fall. Some farmers may
even go out of business. If fewer chickens are produced, resources
will be released back to society where they are likely to be re-em-
ployed. The net loss to society is the loss to consumers associated
with the higher price of chickens (the change in "consumer sur-
plus") plus the loss in net revenues to the farmers after they have
adjusted their production techniques to the disposal-system require-
ment (the change in "producer surplus").
The remainder of this section will address the social costs of
reducing nutrient loads arising from municipal sewage treatment
plants and from agriculture. The focus is on these two sources be-
cause they.are responsible for most of the nutrient loadings.22
1. Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs).-Municipal sewage
treatment plants will surely be required to reduce the nutrients in
their effluents. They are the most controllable (although not neces-
sarily the least expensive) source of nutrients, and they discharge
nitrogen in the form most easily used in the Bay's food chain. 21
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 3, in an average rainfall year they
are responsible for only 28 percent of nitrogen loadings, although
their share of phosphorus loadings is much larger (52 percent) and
their share of both nutrients would rise in a low rainfall year.
To obtain a measure of the social cost of nutrient reductions at
POTWs, we assume that the quantity of waste treatment services
demanded is unaffected by price. Then an increase in the cost of
treatment not subsidized by federal or state governments will be
passed entirely on to customers. In this case, the loss in consumer
surplus is the social cost to society and is equal to the increase in
revenues received by the POTW. If the POTW (as a public institu-
tion) sets prices only to cover costs, then, holding aside the subsidy
issue, this increase in revenue should equal the annualized cost of
2 I. If the captured nutrients can be recycled into producing crops, then the loss in
profits may be minimal.
22. Costs of phosphorus reductions have already been imposed through the bans on
phosphate detergents or directives to reduce their phosphate content. It is assumed here
that further controls on phosphates in detergents will not be forthcoming and that,
therefore, no further reductions in phosphates will be available from this source. In any
case, such controls might not reduce, and may even increase, algal growth in the Bay in
the summer months.
23. NuTRIENT CONTROL IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, supra note 9, at 17.
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capital and operating expenditures incurred by the POTW or local-
ity to upgrade the plant. If it is further assumed that the social value
of the loss in government services represented by the diversion of
government funds to the POTW equals the amount of the subsidy,
then the increment to total annualized capital plus operating cost at
the plant, the common-sense cost measure, is-the appropriate mea-
sure of social cost.
Economists summarize the relationship between alternative
percentage reductions in effluent loadings and social costs in "cost
functions." Much research has been conducted to estimate such
functions for removing biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and to-
tal suspended solids (TSS).24 These studies show that after 90 per-
cent removal is achieved, costs to remove additional percentages of
these pollutants increase sharply. Comparatively little work has
been done to estimate such functions for nutrients. Rather, re-
searchers typically produce point estimates of the costs to upgrade
specific plants to meet specific nutrient effluent standards, using the
common-sense cost measure discussed above.25 Such estimates
generally suffer from an upward bias because they usually consider
very limited approaches to nutrient reductions.
This typical approach was taken by the Chesapeake Bay Pro-
gram (CBP) in support of the Bay cleanup. Their 1983 study esti-
mated the incremental costs of reducing nutrients at POTWs to
meet effluent standards of 1 mg/I of TP and 6 mg/ TN, given 1980
baseline loads and load estimates for the year 2000.26 The study
assumed that plants not currently meeting the standards would in-
stall a chemical addition process to remove phosphorus in the influ-
ent and a nitrification/denitrification process to remove nitrogen.
Table 3 summarizes the results of the study.
In meeting these effluent standards given 1980 loads, TP and
TN loads were estimated to fall by 35 percent and 21 percent, re-
spectively, over the March to October period. 27 Aggregate esti-
24. See, e.g., Frass & Munley, Municipal Wastewater Treatment Cost, I I J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGrr. 28 (1984).
25. See, e.g., PHOSPHORUS MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TASK FORCE, PHOSPHORUS MAN-
AGEMENT FOR THE GREAT LAKES (Apr. 30, 1980) (draft of a report presented to the Great
Lakes Water Quality Board and the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board).
26. See CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 4, at 56-57. Other
scenarios were also examined, but this one was the most stringent and the only one that
examined nitrogen removal. Currently. Maryland and Pennsylvania have set a 2 mg/i
phosphorus removal standard for POTWs. None of the States have nitrogen removal
standards. See id. at 52.
27. The CBP's report estimated that nitrogen loads would be reduced by 26%. Be-
cause phosphorus and nitrogen are taken up by organisms in a fixed ratio, however,
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TABLE 3
LOADINGS AND COSTS OF MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
TP TN
Baseline Loadings (Millions of Ibs)'
POTW 7.173 41.289
Agriculture 3.715 87.735
Other 2.870 17.201
Total 13.758 146.225
POTWs (I mg/I TP, 6 mg/I TN in effluent)
Reduction (millions) 4.815 30.707
Percent Reduction' 35 21
Present Discounted Cost'
(millions of 1982 dollars) $804.6 $2534.0
Present Discounted Cost/lb Removedd $5.61 $2.79
Agriculture (Level 2 = conservation tillage for all conventional tillage crops)
Percent Reduction 6 1.3
Present Value Cost'
(millions of 1982 dollars) $10.53
Cost/ib Removed' $0.32 $0.11
'Baseline loadings (millions of lbs per year) (March to October) over average rainfall year, 1980
waste water flows.
'Adjusted for increased TN availability in the Bay.
'Capital cost plus PDV of 20 years of O&M discounted at 7.25 percent.
d Loadings scaled to 12 months and multiplied by 20 to match 20 years plant lifetime assumed for
cost calculation; 21 percent TN reduction used in calculation.
'Cost figure cannot be allocated between TP and TN. It represents an aggregate cost of
reductions.
'Same as c. In addition, cost is split evenly between the nutrients.
mated costs for POTWs were $804.6 million for phosphorus
removal and $2534.0 million for nitrogen removal, or a cost per
pound of reduction of $5.61 for TP and $2.79 for TN. These costs
are larger and percentage removals lower for the year 2000, because
population growth increases TP and TN loads.
Consideration of recent innovations in nutrient removal may
dramatically reduce such cost estimates. Preliminary data from a
number of demonstration projects for the single-stage activated
reductions in TP without commensurate reductions in TN beyond a certain point will
actually increase the availability of nitrogen for transport to the Bay. Therefore, some of
the nitrogen reductions obtained directly through nitrogen controls will be offset. The
21% figure accounts for this offset.
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sludge process 28 indicate that existing POTWs with secondary treat-
ment (for removing BOD and TSS) can be retrofitted for this new
technology to remove 75 percent of the TP and from 60 to 75 per-
cent of the TN in the influent (depending on the strength of BOD in
the influent) at trivial capital cost.29 Moreover, operating costs may
be up to 20 percent lower than those for conventional treatment
removing only BOD. Over the lifetime of the plant, the cost of re-
moving BOD, TN, and TP after retrofitting may be actually less than
the cost of removing BOD alone by conventional methods. New
plants can also be designed with this technology in mind. Plans for
a huge, 50-million-gallons-per-day (MGD) plant in Norfolk, Virginia
call for TP removal to 1 mg/I and TN removal to 7 mg/ (70 percent
removal) at a capital cost only 2.3 percent greater than that of a
conventional activated sludge plant of the same size. °
Other innovative and relatively inexpensive methods of TP re-
moval are available. A POTW treating Detroit wastes uses a steel
waste product to precipitate out the phosphorus. While sludge
amounts have increased somewhat and there is concern about
higher levels of heavy metals in the sludge than before the innova-
tion, TP removal costs are very low. 31 Researchers at the Interna-
tional Joint Commission3 2 have also found that reductions in TP
removal costs are possible by pre-stressing bacteria to give up their
phosphorus before introducing them to the waste stream.
2. Agniculture.-Agriculture is responsible for 27 percent of the
phosphorus and 60 percent of the nitrogen loadings to the Bay in an
average rainfall year, with much of these loadings transported down
the Susquehanna River. Thus, agricultural loadings, particularly for
nitrogen, must be reduced to meet the 40 percent reduction target.
The costs of controlling agricultural nutrient runoff have re-
28. See NUTRIENT CONTROL IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, supra note 9, at 17-19.
29. The capital cost of retrofitting the York River plant (with a flow of 7 million
gallons per day (MGD)) was only $110,000; it was estimated that only a 10% increment
to capital cost was needed to upgrade the 40 MGD Lambert Point Primary Treatment
Plant in Virginia to secondary treatment with phosphorus and nitrogen removal. Id. at
17. The upgrade of the 3.5 MGD Pontiac, Michigan plant was carried out for only
$50,000. Id. at 17-18.
30. Personal communication with Dr. Clifford Randall, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University (Sept. 1987).
31. Personal communication with Kent Fuller, Staff, International Joint Commission
(Aug. 1987).
32. The International Joint Commission, formed in 1909, has jurisdiction over ques-
tions and disputes between Canada and the United States regarding the use, obstruc-
tion, or diversion of boundary waters.
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ceived much attention, but the problem is so complicated that credi-
ble estimates of social costs for the Chesapeake Bay are generally
unavailable."s The only costs estimated by the CBP were for the
percentage reductions in TP and TN, given the adoption of conser-
vation tillage on all acres in the basin currently under conventional
tillage. s4 Unfortunately, with an estimated 8.8 million acres (out of
41 million acres of cropland) available for conversion, only small
reductions in total loadings--6 percent and 1.3 percent of total
loadings of TP and TN, respectivelyS 5 -could be obtained from this
type of agricultural control. This finding is particularly unfortunate
because the social cost of changing tillage practices may be low. In
fact, the CBP assumed that conversion costs were zero and that the
only cost of conversion would be for increased education and tech-
nical assistance to farmers-$10.53 million.3 6 By arbitrarily splitting
the cost equally between the two jointly removed nutrients, the CBP
estimated the costs to be $0.32 per pound removed of TP and $0.11
per pound removed of TN.
As noted by the CBP, conservation tillage is a relatively poor
choice for reducing nitrogen loads, as runoff of this substance is not
33. See H. Peskin, Estimating the Benefits and Costs of Nonpoint Source Control Policy for the
Chesapeahe Bay: Information Needs and Analytical Issues, presented at the Third Annual Con-
ference on the Economics of Chesapeake Bay Management in Annapolis, Md. (May 27-
29, 1987) (preliminary draft). As an example of the complications, a recent study of the
Nansemond-Chuckatuck, Virginia sub-watershed found that whether nitrogen, phos-
phorus, or sediment loss was controlled had a large effect on the acreage planted under
corn and under soybeans, as well as on whether no-till or conventional till techniques
were used. These decisions, in turn, would affect the magnitude of social costs. Kramer,
Alternative Incentive Systems for Reducing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution, in THE Eco-
NOMICS OF CHESAPEAKE BAY MANAGEMENT 8-16 (M. Jacoby ed. 1986).
34. CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 4, at 80. This scenario
is termed "Level 2." Id.
35. Load reductions are for March to October only, under the assumption that nutri-
ent runoff is negligible in the winter months.
36. The zero estimate was based in part on the work of Pierre Crosson, who esti-
mated that production costs per acre are 5 to 10% larger for conventional tillage than
for conservation tillage on well-drained soils. See P. CROSSON, CONSERVATION TILLAGE
AND CONVENTIONAL TILLAGE: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 14-15 (198 1). Nevertheless,
the social costs of conversion likely will be positive if the adoption of conservation tillage
(or any nutrient control strategy) occurs basin-wide. This results because the savings
from conversion have been observed at farms that have voluntarily converted. Such
farms are likely to have the most favorable conditions for conservation tillage, i.e., they
can realize the greatest economic benefit (or the smallest economic losses) from conver-
sion. Conservation tillage will undoubtedly be more costly if applied in less suitable
areas. Further, there may be significant hidden costs of conservation tillage because
such practices require the use of more herbicides and pesticides than conventional till-
age and may increase nitrogen filtration to groundwater. For more current information,
see Crosson, Hanthorn & Duffy, The Economics of Conservation Tillage, in No-TILLAGE AND
SURFACE-TILLAGE AGRICULTURE: THE TILLAGE REVOLUTION (1986).
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closely tied to soil loss. Cost estimates for other approaches that
reduce nitrogen loads from agriculture are thus badly needed.
3. POTWs and Agiculture.-Taken together, the control strate-
gies examined above can attain the desired 40 percent reduction in
TP loadings, but only a very costly 23 percent reduction in nitrogen
loadings.3 7 Implementation of other options for controlling nutri-
ents in agriculture (such as use of buffer areas to strip runoff of its
nutrients), controls on animal wastes, and further controls by indus-
trial point sources and other nonpoint sources of nutrients can help
bring these costs down. It is nevertheless likely that low-cost re-
moval of nitrogen in the quantities agreed to by the States will de-
pend in large measure on promising, but still experimental,
technologies applied to wastewater.
C. Costs and Benefits
Given the significant gaps in knowledge about the costs and
benefits of nutrient reductions, it is impossible to offer an estimate
of the "optimal" degree of reductions. Such gaps also preclude firm
conclusions about whether the benefits of a 40 percent reduction
exceed the costs. It is instructive, nevertheless, to compare the costs
to the benefits, bearing in mind that the benefits may be greatly un-
derestimated for all the reasons mentioned above and the costs,
given the treatment technologies considered, are slightly underesti-
mated because they do not account for population growth.
Table 4 compares 20 years of benefits discounted at 7.5 percent
to the present discounted value of costs incurred over the same pe-
riod and using the same discount rate. 8 Because the benefits are
for a 20 percent nutrient reduction and the costs apply to a 40 per-
cent reduction in TP and a 22 percent reduction in TN, the costs of
nitrogen reductions and the benefits need adjustment. Assume that
recreation benefits are linearly related to percent removal and that
nitrogen removal can be obtained from agriculture at 25 percent of
the cost for nitrogen removal at POTWs. In this case, the range of
recreation benefits ($577-$1654 million) would be far less than cost
($3902 million). Because the water quality change being valued by
37. Because the bioavailability of the nutrients depends on the ratio of TP to TN, it
may be misleading to add the percentage reductions across the POTW and agricultural
control strategies.
38. The issue of the appropriate discount rate to use in this situation and whether
the rate should be identical for discounting benefits and costs is very controversial. For
a full discussion of discount rates in a number of public policy settings, see RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE, DISCOUNTING FOR TIME AND RISK IN ENERGY POLICY (1982).
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the contingent valuation (CV) survey is unknown, it is unclear how
to adjust these estimates. If, arbitrarily, they were doubled, then the
"high" CV estimate of benefits ($4231 million) and the cost esti-
mate would be nearly equal. About the most that can be said is that
it is not obvious that the benefits of the 40 percent nutrient reduc-
tions outweigh the costs. Nevertheless, if the single-stage process
for nitrogen removal at POTWs becomes widely adopted and lives
up to its promise, this cost-benefit test could be met with relative
ease.
TABLE 4
PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
NUTRIENT REDUCTIONS (MILLIONS OF 1984 DOLLARS)
Present Discounted Value
COSTS (TP: 41 percent; TN: 22 percent) $3,349.1
Adjusted' 3,901.8
BENEFITS Low Medium High
Revealed Preference
Recreation
(TP, TN: 20 percent;
catch: 20 percent) 288.5 511.8 826.8
Adjusted' 577.0 1,023.6 1,653.6
Contingent Valuation
(unacceptable to acceptable
swimming) 1,192.8 1,654.6 2,115.4
Adjusted' 2,385.6 3,309.2 4,230.8
"Additional 18 percent removal of TN at present discounted cost of $0.60/1b (versus $2.79/lb for
POTWs). See Table 3.
"Assuming a linear relationship between benefits and percentage removal of nutrients.
'Doubling the CV estimates.
Taking a dynamic perspective, it is noteworthy that the 40
percent reduction will occur in increments, with the effects on water
quality monitored and decisions on the resources necessary to the
cleanup made on a continuing basis. If the costs of reducing
nutrients appear to be too large relative to the benefits, the policy
can be re-evaluated.
Unless the policies used to achieve these reductions are
reasonably efficient, the costs of attaining any given reduction in
nutrients will be greater than necessary. In this case, political
pressure may mount prematurely to end or scale back the cleanup
program. It is to the issue of designing an efficient strategy for the
allocation of nutrient reductions among the States that we now turn.
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II. ALLOCATING LOAD REDUCTIONS TO THE PARTICIPANT STATES
After obtaining commitments to a Bay-wide load reduction tar-
get, the next step is to determine how to meet this target. According
to state officials, a two-part process will be involved: load reduc-
tions will be allocated to each state, followed by the allocation of
reductions to sources within the state. In practice, however, this
process is unlikely to be this neatly dichotimized. More likely, some
reductions will be mandated for various types of sources (such as
POTWs) irrespective of location, with the remaining reductions al-
located by state.
In this section, several aspects of these allocation processes are
examined. First, the notion of an efficient allocation of nutrient re-
ductions is explored to develop a yardstick for evaluating the two-
step process and several commonly used allocation rules. Second,
the efficiency and equity implications of the two-step process and
these common rules are discussed. Finally, a system of state-by-
state Nutrient Reduction Credits is presented as a useful adjunct to
any allocation process. The paper does not examine economically
efficient mechanisms for source-by-source control, such as effluent
fees or marketable permits.
A. The Efficient Rule
The efficient allocation of nutrient reductions is one that pro-
duces the largest excess of benefits from related water quality im-
provements over the costs of obtaining these improvements.
Economic theory shows that such an outcome can be obtained if, for
each source of nutrients, the marginal cost of nutrient removal is set
equal to the marginal benefit from reductions.
There are two polar cases that can help make the efficiency rule
clear. In one marginal benefits from nutrient reductions are equal
and constant for all sources but it is assumed that each source, or
class of sources, faces different marginal nutrient removal costs; in
another marginal costs are assumed to be identical and constant
across sources but marginal benefits differ.
The first case, which is termed the cost-effective case, is most
closely analogous to the recent Bay initiative. As a Bay-wide 40 per-
cent reduction in nutrients is called for, the implicit assumption is
that the marginal benefits of nutrient reductions are invariant Bay-
wide. In other words, a pound of nutrient reduction is assumed to
produce the same benefit to society no matter where the reductions
occur. In this case the efficient allocation is one that minimizes total
nutrient reduction costs by obtaining nutrient removal from the
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sources with the lowest marginal costs until marginal costs for all
controlled sources are equal.3 9
Compare this rule to the outcome of a two-step allocation pro-
cess. Because the mix of sources is likely to be different within each
state, statewide marginal nutrient removal costs may be quite differ-
ent for each state. As the efficient allocation rule requires Bay-wide
equalization of marginal costs, if marginal nutrient removal costs
are equated within each state but not between states, total nutrient
removal costs will be higher than necessary.
Thus, the efficient rule looks past the state as the appropriate
unit of nutrient reduction allocation, and focuses instead on individ-
ual sources. Following the efficiency rule, the allocation of reduc-
tions to states would simply "fall out" of the allocation to sources.
That is, the state allocations would reflect the spatial configuratiof
of low-cost sources of nutrient reductions.
The assumption of the first case, that the marginal benefits of
nutrient reductions are equal and constant throughout the Bay, is a
strong assumption. Indeed, that marginal benefits vary by source
location is generally accepted. According to the CBP, reductions in
nutrients from sources below the fall line have a greater impact on
the Bay than an equal reduction from sources above it. In addition,
reductions from POTWs may produce larger marginal benefits than
those from agricultural sources, because POTWs produce TP in a
more available form than nonpoint sources and contribute the ma-
jority of TN loadings during the sensitive, low-flow summer
months.4" The quality of receiving water may also affect the benefits
of nutrient reductions. Assume that, because of ecological relation-
ships, the lower the baseline water quality, the greater the improve-
ment of the ecosystem that can be obtained from a given reduction
in nutrient loads. Also assume that water quality is lower near
source B than source A. Then the identical reduction in nutrients
by A and B may lead to greater ecological improvements near B.
Thus, to maximize benefits, source B should reduce nutrients more
than A. Even if the location of nutrient reductions had no hydrolog-
ical or biological significance, if use of the Bay is greater near source
B than source A, then the benefits from nutrient reductions at B
should be larger than from those at A.
Given the above discussion, the second case takes the extreme
39. For this rule to work, marginal costs must be increasing with additional nutrient
reductions.
40. See CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 4, at 48-72.
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position that all sources face identical and constant nutrient removal
costs, but permits marginal benefits to vary by source. To maximize
total benefits of nutrient reductions, marginal benefits must be
equalized for all controlled sources. 4 ' Again, from the viewpoint of
the two-part process, the appropriate state allocations would simply
fall out of the marginal benefit analysis.
In general, both the marginal costs and marginal benefits of nu-
trient reductions will likely vary by source. In this case, reductions
should be allocated where net benefits are maximized. As noted
above, as the distributions of marginal costs and marginal benefits
are unlikely to follow state lines, allocations of nutrient reductions
to each state without consideration of these distributions are likely
to be inefficient, even if each state efficiently allocated its share of
nutrient reductions to sources within the state.
As a consequence of the distribution of nutrient reductions
based on marginal benefits, marginal costs, or both, some states are
likely to bear a greater share of the cleanup costs than other states.
This disparity could make it difficult to obtain an agreement to allo-
cate nutrient reductions strictly according to efficiency considera-
tions. For instance, assuming all sources produce equal marginal
benefits from nutrient reductions, if state A would have to rely on
high-cost nutrient reductions from POTWs while state B could pro-
duce all of the necessary Bay-wide reductions from low-cost agricul-
tural sources, then under an efficiency rule, state B would bear all of
the cost of meeting the nutrient reduction target. Certain types of
sources, such as agriculture, might likewise be perceived to bear a
disproportionate share of the private costs, simply because they can
obtain nutrient reductions at relatively low costs per pound.
It is important to realize, however, that the equity problem is
not peculiar to an efficiency rule. In particular, Pennsylvania's
unique position in the Bay-as a major contributor to Bay nutrients
yet a minor beneficiary of Bay improvements42_suggests that this
state will be reluctant to shoulder a heavy cleanup burden irrespec-
tive of the underlying allocation rule.43
41. It is frequently assumed that marginal benefits decrease with increases in nutri-
ent reductions.
42. Only 8% of Maryland saltwater fishing days in 1980 were attributable to Penn-
sylvanians (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1982), while 40% of total (March to October)
TN loads to the Bay are attributable to the Susquehanna River.
43. It is generally agreed that to date Pennsylvania has taken its fair share of the
cleanup burden. Altruism, the benefits to the state realized from a cleaner Susquehanna
River, and the federal money for Bay cleanup made available to the state ($10 million
per year) probably account for much of this behavior. Thus, with appropriate incen-
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B. Common Rules
Because of its historical precedent and intuitive appeal, the load
proportionality rule is a sure candidate for consideration by the
States. Here, load reductions are allocated in proportion to each
state's share of baseline loads. In the context of the new Bay Agree-
ment, this rule implies that each state's baselines would be rolled
back 40 percent.
Two rules for allocation that may be more acceptable to juris-
dictions than the efficiency rule but, like the efficiency rule, apply
directly to sources of nutrients, are the performance standard and
the design standard. The former rule sets minimum requirements
on source performance in removing nutrients, while the latter sets
technological requirements for nutrient removal. With performance
standards, the States might issue effluent standards to the applicable
sources (possibly in, mg/I of TP and TN in the effluent of all
POTWs). Acceptance of a design standard rule might commit the
States to require their POTWs to use biological nutrient removal
processes, or their farmers who use conventional tillage techniques
to switch to techniques that less frequently disturb the soil.
An example of how these rules work in practice is available. The
United States and Canada recently applied a combination of the
load proportionality and performance standards rules to determine
the allocation of reductions in their TP loads to Lake Erie. The par-
ticipants estimated baseline loads to the lake at 18,500 tons per year
(t/y) of TP. Researchers developed a water quality model for the
lake to determine the amount of TP reduction necessary to meet a
goal similar to that for the Bay: restoration of aerobic conditions in
the deep water of Lake Erie. This was 7500 t/y, a 40 percent reduc-
tion. The countries agreed to obtain part of this reduction by sub-
jecting POTWs to a performance standard of 1 mg/ TP (estimated
to reduce loads by 5500 t/y). To obtain the remaining 2000 t/y,
both countries agreed to use the load proportionality rule. As the
United States produced an estimated 85 percent of the remaining
13,000 t/y, it agreed to reduce its TP loads by 85 percent of 2000
t/y (1700 t/y) while Canada agreed to reduce its loads by 15 percent
(300 t/y).44
tives, this asymmetry of benefits and costs does not necessarily mean that Pennsylvania
could not be counted on to continue its cleanup efforts. Mueller & Oates, The lanage-
ment of the Chesapeake Bay: Alternative Structures for Decision Mlaking, in PROCEEDINGS: SEC-
OND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF CHESAPEAKE BAY MANAGEMENT 18-20
(1986).
44. Personal communication with Kent Fuller, Staff, International Joint Commission
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In spite of the intuitive appeal of some of these rules and prece-
dent for their use, they are neither efficient nor necessarily equita-
ble, according to common definitions of equity. Consider the load
proportionality rule. This concept is likely to be inefficient because
reductions are not allocated on the basis of net benefits, but on the
basis of quantity of baseline nutrient loads. These baselines may
have little, if any, relationship to marginal costs and benefits of nu-
trient reductions. For instance, as the mix of sources is likely to vary
among states, a state may have to rely on higher-cost sources of nu-
trient removal than it would if an efficient allocation had been used.
At the same time, some relatively low-cost sources of nutrient re-
moval may go unused because the state in which such sources are
located has met its load reduction target with even lower-cost
sources.
While the load proportionality rule may lack efficiency, it carries
a superficial appeal to equity because each state is required to re-
duce its loads by an equal proportion, with the inference that the
costs of such reductions will also be proportional. In the presence
of increasing marginal control costs, 45 however, this inference is in-
correct. Indeed, the load proportionality rule can reward states lag-
ging in their pollution control efforts. If marginal costs rise with
additional control, sources in states with less stringent controls or
enforcement will incur lower costs than those in more environmen-
tally conscious states, given the same load reductions and source
mix. For instance, take two states with equal baseline loadings (and,
therefore, equal nutrient reduction targets). State A (with many
more sources of nutrients than B) may have implemented more con-
trols to reduce loadings than state B. For this reason, sources in
state A, both individually and in the aggregate, may face greater
marginal costs than those in B because state A has already "used
up" the available inexpensive nutrient removal options.
If equity is defined as benefits matching costs, Pennsylvania,
which contributes loadings but shares little in the benefits of reduc-
ing them, may find the load proportionality rule inequitable. A load
proportionality rule assigns this state a 40 percent reduction in
(Aug. 1987). For a full discussion of phosphorus management in the Great Lakes area.
See PHOSPHORUS MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TASK FORCE, PHOSPHORUS MANAGEMENT FOR
THE GREAT LAKES (Apr. 30, 1980) (draft of a report presented to the Great Lakes Water
Quality Board and the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board).
45. Constant marginal costs imply that total costs rise at a constant rate with remov-
als while rising marginal costs imply that total costs rise at an increasing rate with
removals.
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loads in return for much smaller benefits than those attainable by
other states.
The design and performance standard rules also are likely to be
inefficient, although the former is likely to be worse. The basic
problem is that the same types of sources in each state may be at
different levels of performance or technology because of local con-
ditions (e.g., low-tillage techniques may be less prevalent in state A
than state B because of differences in soil drainage characteristics).
If these different levels of performance or technology are based on
cost considerations, then requiring the use of specific technologies
or meeting specific performance standards Bay-wide will result inev-
itably in higher costs than necessary. That is, both of these rules
treat heterogeneous members of the same class of activity as if they
were homogeneous instead of permitting them to adapt appropri-
ately to local conditions. In addition, a performance or design stan-
dard does not provide incentives for low-cost sources of nutrient
removal to control more than required and, correspondingly, does
not permit higher-cost sources to control less than required. Thus,
jurisdictional costs and Bay-wide costs would be higher than neces-
sary. The design standard, however, is generally more inefficient
than the performance standard because the design standard gives
sources less freedom to respond appropriately to the rule than does
the performance standard.
Both of these rules may appear equitable because they seem-
ingly require equal sacrifice of all like sources. But the distribution
of costs across sources and jurisdictions is dependent on baseline
performance or technology; sources already meeting the standard,
for example, will incur zero costs.
C. Nutrient Reduction Credits
An efficient and equitable distribution of load reductions may
appear to be difficult to achieve, given the discussion above. Yet
economists have devised approaches to obtain efficient allocations
of cleanup activity,46 and a relatively new approach-marketable
pollution permits-has both efficiency and equity.47 While these ap-
46. For a comprehensive discussion of effluent charges, see F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE,
P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH Eco-
NOMIC INCENTIVES 59-68 (1977).
47. For a general discussion of the pollution permit concept, see T. TIETENBERG,
EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985); Krupnick,
Oates & Van De Verg. On Marketable Air-Pollution Permits: The Case for a System of Pollution
Offsets, 10J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 14-36 (1983).
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proaches are devised for application to individual pollution sources,
the basic idea behind marketable permits can be applied to states as
the trading entities and used as an adjunct to any other approach
adopted by the States to allocate nutrient reductions. This adjunct
approach is a variation of the EPA's Emission Reduction Credit pol-
icy (ERCs),4 8 here called NRCs, for Nutrient Reduction Credits.
This approach is described below.
For simplicity, assume that the benefits of nutrient reductions
are equal wherever they occur, but that marginal costs differ across
jurisdictions. Using the NRC approach, each state receives an
agreed upon nutrient reduction target, with the sum of the targets
equal to the Bay-wide reduction desired. The targets can be appor-
tioned by the load proportionality rule or any other simple rule.
Against this target the States credit reductions obtained within the
state.49 At any time, a state could purchase credits for nutrient re-
ductions obtained (or promised to be obtained) by other states to
help fulfill its obligations. Conversely, a state could sell its reduc-
tions to another state, recognizing that it would have to come up
with additional credits to meet its target baseline by the attainment
deadline.
This system has a number of advantages. It is efficient in the
sense that cleanup costs are lower than they would be without state
trading. A state facing relatively high cleanup costs to meet its tar-
get would seek out NRCs from states with lower costs. Because the
price of the trade would be less than the cost to the high-cost state
(otherwise it would not enter into the bargain) and higher than the
cost to the low-cost state (otherwise that state would have no incen-
tive to sell), aggregate costs of meeting the overall nutrient reduc-
tion target would be lower than if each state proceeded alone. Put
another way, the trade would have the effect of concentrating the
cleanup in states with low-cost sources, paid for by the states with
high-cost sources. In addition, as states seek to be sellers of NRCs,
there is incentive for them to look hard for novel, low-cost sources
of nutrient reductions.
The NRC system addresses the equity problem in two ways.
48. See Emission Trading Policy Statement, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076-86 (1982) (release
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
49. Of course, states do not incur the full costs of cleanup. Even in Maryland and
Virginia, where state subsidization of cleanup activities is the major component of their
Bay programs, the private sector bears some costs. In this case, private companies, farm
cooperatives, or developers could seek representation by the state or even bargain with
sources of nutrients in other states. Private sector involvement, however, requires that
states determine baselines and impose nutrient reduction targets on such sources.
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First, the initial allocation of nutrient reduction targets to states
constitutes a degree of freedom within the system. As the efficiency
properties of the approach work irrespective of the initial allocation
of nutrient reductions, 0 this allocation can be adjusted to obtain
political agreement and to meet equity concerns. Thus, if the asym-
metry of costs and benefits in Pennsylvania makes the state reluctant
to accept a large cleanup burden, the state can be granted a small
initial allocation. Other states, in seeking to meet their larger target
reductions, could then pay Pennsylvania to reduce its loadings be-
yond its target through the NRC vehicle. Second, because high-cost
states could, in effect, pay low-cost states to implement cleanup, this
system reduces costs to the high-cost state while compensating low-
cost states for their cleanup activity. The result is an efficient bal-
ancing of abatement activity across the States. Again, such an ar-
rangement might be particularly attractive to a state like
Pennsylvania which, because of its low reliance on Bay services, has
a lower incentive to reduce its nutrients than the other states but
may have many low-cost, agricultural sources of nutrient reductions.
Then, through the monetary benefit from the sale of its NRCs, the
state could reduce its nutrients beyond the nutrient reductions it
would otherwise make based on in-state benefits and altruism.
If the marginal benefits of nutrient reductions vary by the loca-
tion of the reduction, then modifications to the NRC system can be
made.5' Assuming a pound of nutrient reduction in state A pro-
vides lower benefits than a pound in state B, state A's NRCs can be
traded with B's on less than a one-to-one basis. For example, if
state A sold ten tons of nutrient reductions to state B, credits for
these NRCs would amount to something less than ten tons against
state B's nutrient reduction target. For this modification to work,
the establishment of trading ratios between all possible pairs of
states is necessary, but the system would operate otherwise as
above.
The NRC approach is not without its drawbacks, such as the
need to establish baseline loads and enforce nutrient reduction con-
tracts. But the problems of establishing baselines and of enforce-
ment are common to any approach. In addition, the NRC approach
cannot completely account for localized water quality concerns. To
see this, take the extreme case in which, because of its high nutrient
removal costs, state A meets all of its target reductions by purchas-
50. T. TIETENBERG, supra note 48, at 80-91.
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ing them from state B. In this case, loadings to the tributaries in A
remain unchanged while improvements occur in B's tributaries. Of
course, if this outcome is unacceptable. to A, it can always clean up
its tributaries to the extent desired and use NRCs to satisfy its target
reductions. This is one example of how the NRC approach can act
as an adjunct to whatever allocation approach is chosen by the
States.
Even the approach described above is too simple to account for
all real-world complexities. For instance, the timing of loadings is
important to Bay water quality. An extreme case could occur when
state A would have met its targets entirely with reductions at
POTWs but instead purchased NRCs from state B, which created
them with nonpoint source controls. As loadings from POTWs are
continuous but those from nonpoint sources are coincident with
precipitation events, this distribution of reductions may be unac-
ceptable. Specifying nutrient reduction targets separately for point
and nonpoint sources and then restricting transactions of NRCs to
those between like sources may be one solution to this problem.
The interrelationship between TP and TN reductions and
bioavailability introduces another complexity. If trades of TP and
TN are arranged independently, then the prospect for water quality
improvements commensurate with the nutrient reductions underly-
ing the trades is uncertain. Trading both pollutants together in a
given ratio may be one solution to this problem. Another approach
may be to subject each trade to scrutiny by water quality models and
to permit only trades that lead to improved water quality in the Bay
without diminishing quality in the tributaries. Because either phos-
phorus or nitrogen may be the factor limiting algal growth, depend-
ing on the season, trades must account for the interrelationship
between the timing of the load reductions and the nutrient being
reduced. It should be mentioned, however, that any approach to
reducing nutrients must address the issues of timing and pollutant
interaction.
II. CONCLUSION
The recent agreement to reduce nutrient loads to the Chesa-
peake Bay by 40 percent by the year 2000 is a major milestone in the
management of a complex, valuable environmental asset. The use
of economic theory and analytical techniques can aid in this man-
agement. Adoption of the Nutrient Reduction Credit approach, or a
similar approach, to provide flexibility in the assignment of respon-
sibility for nutrient reductions can help assure that the costs of at-
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taining these reductions are as low as possible. In addition, the
success of the nutrient reduction program in improving social wel-
fare can be gauged as the costs and benefits of such reductions are
tracked.
To track the progress of the cleanup, however, economists need
adequate information on the extent of water quality improvements,
as well as on the concomitant changes in recreational and commer-
cial use of the Bay. Serious gaps in baseline information about the
use and value of Bay services as well as the costs of reducing nutri-
ent loadings, particularly those from agriculture, will imperil the ef-
fort to gauge the progress of the nutrient reduction program.
Filling in these gaps and building an economic information gather-
ing and analysis system must therefore be a high priority for the
implementation of a successful nutrient reduction program.
